War Diary of 2/4th Royal Berkshire
Sunday 28th May 1916, France, Merville, K21
Battn detrained at BERGUETTE at 3.30pm and 5pm. Marched to billets NW of MERVILLE at K21. Remainder of Brigade 2/4 OXFORD AND BUCKS LI, 2/5 GLOSTER Regt, and 2/1 BUCKS Battn billeted in adjoining areas within 1 mile.
61st (South Midland) DIVISION [Major General Duncan] –in corps reserve
182 Brigade [Brigadier General Evans]
2/6th Bn Royal Warwickshire Regiment
2/7th Bn Royal Warwickshire Regiment
2/8th Bn Royal Warwickshire Regiment
182 Light Trench Mortar Battery
183 Brigade [Brigadier General Anley]
1/9th Bn Royal Scots
1/5th Bn Gordon Highlanders
1/8th Bn Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders
183 Light Trench Mortar Battery
184 Brigade [Brigadier General Thorne]
2/4th Bn Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
2/5th Bn Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
2/4th Bn Royal Berkshire Regiment
184 Light Trench Mortar Battery
Division Artillery [Brigadier General Ooseley]
306 Brigade RFA: A B C D Batteries
307 Brigade RFA: A B C D Batteries
X & Y Medium Trench Mortar Batteries
61 Machine Gun Battalion
1/5th Bn Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry (pioneer bn)
476, 478, 479 Field Companies RE
61 Signal Company
Story of the 2/5th Battalion the Gloucester Regiment 1914-1918
ed by A.F.Barnes
ISBN: 9781843427582
Format: 2003 N&M Press reprint (original pub 1930) 192pp with 39 b/w photos and 12 maps.
October 1917
“About this time the Brigade formed a School of Instruction at Arras under the command of Major Bennett of the Oxfords; and to the school each battalion sent a platoon. After eight days’ training, a competition was held. It speaks well for the efficiency of the 2/5th that of the four platoons sent, three won the first prize and the other the 2nd. 2nd Lieutenants. Downing, Ross Jenkins and Welch were the winning Platoon Commanders. The Brigadier told Major Bennett that he was surprised that the Glosters appeared to be the best trained unit in the Brigade, but the Glosters had their own position on this.”
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
“Another feature of this period was a Brigade school, ‘with Bennett as its commandant, at Arras. A week’s course was held for each platoon in the Brigade. The school was well run and partly recompensed for the lack of training during the long tours in the trenches.”
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
“To Avesne, a remote village behind Amiens, the 2 /4th Oxfords were withdrawn early in April for completion with new drafts and for refitting. An amalgamation which was a great advantage to both units of the Battalion with the Bucks now took place. As the 25th Entrenching Battalion the Bucks had been engaged in the fighting round Nesle, when they became attached to a Brigade of the 2Oth Division. They were now most anxious to be sent to join us or at all events to rejoin the 61st Division. Unable to obtain the orders they
desired, the Bucks availed themselves of the prevailing confusion to march away ‘without authority’ and were already at Avesne when the Oxfords arrived.
The addition of some 300 N.C.O.s and men, with whom came such valued officers as Clutsom, Buttfield, Kemp, Lodge, Boase, Kirk, and several others, acted as an infusion of new blood and vigour into the Battalion which had given nearly all of its best in the St. Quentin fighting. As the senior officer now present, I was placed in command of the Battalion after the amalgamation, for which no more suitable surroundings could have been found than Avesne, whose chateau and grounds we had to ourselves. On April 7, before the regimental tailors had half finished substituting the red circles for the black ones previously carried by the Bucks, a large draft of 431 men joined the Battalion from England. Many of these were boys, but among them stood a few veteran soldiers who had been out before and been wounded. With this draft, which I believe was posted without the knowledge that the Bucks had joined us, the Battalion reached the strength of over 1,000 men. It was a goodly force, unhampered by passengers. With Abraham, Murray, and Regimental Sergeant-Major Hedley (from the Bucks) those departments of the Battalion not purely tactical were sure to be well managed. I felt quite confident in the command of this force of men, and General Pagan, the new Brigadier, was kind enough to express his confidence in my ability.
Our billets at Avesne the entire Battalion was accommodated in the buildings of a large chateau from which some army school had been precipitated by the German advance were too good for much hope to be entertained of a long stay in them. The unified command from now onwards brought more rapid moves than formerly had been the custom. Thus at a few hours’ notice ‘billeting parties’ were ordered, not back towards Amiens, but to Merville and St. Venant. The 61st was to become a Division in G.H.Q. reserve behind the old Laventie
sector. But before Battalions could follow their representatives and while the billeting was still in progress the Germans attacked and broke through on the Lys, south of Armentieres. We marched, however, from Avesne on April 11th happy ignorance of this new battle.
Story of the 2/5th Battalion the Gloucester Regiment 1914-1918
ed by A.F.Barnes
ISBN: 9781843427582
Format: 2003 N&M Press reprint (original pub 1930) 192pp with 39 b/w photos and 12 maps.
1st – 8th April 1918
“The 61st Division occupied the Berthaucourt-Gentelles defences from the Bois I’Abbe to the Amiens-Domart road, which line was improved and wired, until the Division was withdrawn on the night of the 2nd to Longueau, leaving behind a composite Company of machine-guns under the orders of the 18th Division. The composite Company rejoined the Division on the 8th.”
The following details are extracted from a great Web site: http://www.purley.eu/H142.htm. The site details the operations of the 2/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment, but within it is contained a wide range of information on the 184th Brigade and the Battalions that made up the Brigade.
“On the 19th July the Brigade (with 183rd Brigade on our right and the 15th Australian Brigade on our left) was ordered to attack, capture and hold with two battalions (2/1 Bucks and 2/4 Royal Berks) the German Front and Support Lines from N 14 a 60. 25 to N 8 d 95. 10. – Two Companies of the 2/4 Oxfords were placed at the disposal of the Brigadier to occupy our front Line in the event of all Companies in the Assaulting Battalions being absorbed in the same: the 2/5 Glosters and remaining two Companies of 2/4 Oxfords were in Divisional Reserve.
The following were also placed at the disposal of the Brigadier: 3rd Field Company R.E. and ‘B’ Company 1/5th Duke of Cornwall’s L.I (Pioneers)
By 9.0.a.m. the Brigade was disposed, in accordance with orders. (vide Sketch No.1).
2 Vickers Machine Guns were posted in the front Line in support of the attack, 4 Vickers Machine Guns were detailed to follow the Assaulting Companies on the positions being captured. 6 Vickers Guns were detailed for indirect fire from vicinity of JOCKS LODGE. Owing to the difficulty of coming within effective range, only one Stokes Mortar was detained to bombard the SUGAR LOAF, it was arranged for 4 Stokes Mortars to follow the Assaulting Companies.
The Assaulting Companies No. 1 & No. 2 were ordered to attack in 4 waves at 20 yards distance.
The 3rd Company was to follow as soon as the position was reported captured, carrying consolidating material. Each
consolidating Company had 4 R.E. and 4 Pioneers detailed to accompany same – An R.E. and a Pioneer officer were also
detailed to supervise work of consolidation.
A portion of Reserve Companies were ordered to carry across NO MAN’S LAND reserve bombs and S.A.A.
Arrangements were made for a party of 3rd Australian Mining Company, under Major Coulter, to blow up, by means of an
ammonal pipe, a continuation of the RHONDDA SAP, after this had been effected for the Pioneer Company attached to the Brigade to dig a communication trench between N 8.d. 25. 15 on the SUGAR LOAF to the RHONDDA SAP – parties working from both sides.
Diary of Events (11. a.m. to 6. p.m.)
11. a.m. Our Artillery opened fire
11.50.a.m. Reported that enemy had shelled our Left Sub-section heavily – some casualties.
12.55 p.m. Report received that enemy’s Artillery fire had diminished slightly – A few salvos on RUE DE TILLELOY
1.20. PM. Report received ROTTEN ROW Communication Trench heavily shelled by 77 mm.
2.10.p.m. Report received that our Support Trenches were heavily shelled with H.E.
2.30.p.m. Telephonic communication with Front Line temporarily severed
2.44.p.m. Enemy firing 103 c.m. on BOND ST Communication Trench
3.25.p.m. The whole sectional Front heavily shelled. Communication effected by Runners
4.24 p.m. Our C.T’s. heavily shelled -BOND ST Communication Trench & PICANTIN AVENUE especially
5.15.p.m.Damage to our Front Line Parapet very severe (numerous casualties)
5.30.p.m. Owing to heavy casualties in Assaulting Companies of both battalions I gave orders for 2 platoons from reserve
Companies to reinforce former – the consolidating companies to be left intact.
6.00.p.m. Communication by telephone with Front Line re-established by laying an additional line from Advanced Battalion H.Q.
Up to 5.30.pm.owing chiefly to the crowded condition of our Front Line Trenches, considerable casualties had taken place,
amounting to 100 killed and wounded in 2/Bucks and 40 killed and wounded in the 4/Royal Berks. This necessitated reorganisation of the Assaulting and consolidating Companies.
At 5.45 p.m. on the right 4/Royal Berks commenced to file out through 2 Sally Ports. On emerging from same they encountered severe Machine Gun Fire – numerous casualties ensued. A certain proportion of the Right Company got through the Sally Ports but only in scattered parties – some of whom are reported to have reached the German wire but, beingunsupported and under heavy machine gun fire and shrapnel fire, were compelled to fall back, they reported that the Germanwire at X 20, X 21 was uncut. A few men only of the left company, 4/Royal Berks got through the Sally Port under heavy Machine Gun fire but failed to advance any appreciable distance. Whilst directing these men from the parapet Lt. Col. J N Beer was killed. Several officers were killed and wounded in endeavouring to initiate an organised forward movement.
At 5.40.pm. the 2/Bucks commenced to file through the Sally Ports but, owing to severe Machine Gun fire directed at the latter,
Lt. Col Williams decided to utilise the Rhondda Sap. This was carried out and the 2 Assaulting Companies were successfully
deployed from head of same., they were however subjected to heavy Machine Gun and shrapnel fire and a certain number of
casualties occurred, whilst waves were getting into position.
At 6.0.p.m punctually the 2/Bucks advanced to the Assault, a withering Machine Gun fire was encountered which mowed down
a large proportion of men, especially with the Right Company. A portion of Capt. Church’s Company on the left pressed through the enemy’s wire on the N.E. face of the Sugar Loaf and fierce fighting was seen to take place on the parapet. A good proportion of this Company, ably led by Captain Church (who was killed just before the glacis (sic) to enemy’s breastworks) got into the Germans trenches. (This has been substantiated by reports from the Right Battalion of the 15thAustralian Brigade)
Owing to the 4/Royal Berks having been driven back on their Right and the same thing having occurred to the Right Battalion
of the 15th Australian Brigade on their left, this lack of support on their flanks seriously impaired what chances the 2/1st Bucks
had of capturing the SUGAR LOAF. The C.O. is of the opinion (with which I concur) that if 2 Reserve Companies had been available at this period fro throwing into the assault, a substantial lodgement would undoubtedly been effected in the SUGAR LOAF. 61 missing N.C.O’s and men in this Battalion testifies to the belief that a considerable proportion of the Left Company of this Battalion got into the German Trenches.
Owing to want of support and heavy casualties the 2/1st Bucks were compelled to effect a withdrawal In accordance with orders,
C.O.s, 2/4 R.Berks and 2/1st Bucks then reorganised their battalions with the view to launching a second attack.
During the enemy bombardment shells emitting a dense column of light green smoke were observable in the vicinity of the Red House (Regimental First Aid Post)
At 6.0.p.m the 1/8 Cornwall’s left the Assembly trenches and proceeded to the Rhondda Gap and started improving it.
184 Machine Gun Company – The Machine Gun company fired 30,000 rounds with indirect fire and supporting the Infantry
attack. 3 of their guns were put out of action by bullets. They endeavoured to silence the enemy’s guns.
184 Light Trench Mortars – The one gun in the Front Line at 4.30. pm. fired 30 rounds on the SUGAR LOAF obtaining direct
hits.
Communications were maintained throughout the Operations from Brigade and Battalion H.Q. From Battalion H.Q. to the Front
Line they were cut between 2 and 3.p.m. but were re-established by 6,0.p.m. Runners were employed and were most satisfactory.”
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
CHAPTER I.
LAVENTIE.
MAY TO OCTOBER, 1916.
On May 24, 1916, the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry landed in France. Members of the Battalion within a day or two were addressing their first field postcards to England. Active service, of Which the prospect had swung, now close, now far, for 18 months, had begun.
The 61st Division, to which the Battalion be- longed, concentrated in the Merville area. The usual period of ‘instruction’ followed. The 2/4th Oxfords went to the Fauquissart sector, east of Laventie. Soon the 61st relieved the Welsh Division, to which it had been temporarily apprenticed, and settled down to hold the line.
It was not long before the Battalion received what is usually termed its ‘ baptism of fire.’ Things were waking up along the front in anticipation of the Franco-British attack on the Somme. Raids took place frequently. Fighting patrols scoured No- Man’s-Land each night. In many places at once the enemy’s wire was bombarded to shreds.
By the end of June an intense feeling of expectancy had developed; activity on both sides reached the highest pitch. The Battalion was not slow in playing its part. One of the early casualties was Lieutenant Moberly, who performed a daring day-
light reconnaissance up to the German wire. He was wounded and with great difficulty and only through remarkable pluck regained our lines.
That same night the Battalion did its first raid, by B Company under Hugh Davenport. The raid was ordered at short notice and was a partial success. If the tangible results were few, B Company
was very properly thanked for its bravery on this enterprise, which had to be carried out against uncut wire and unsubdued machine-guns. Zeder, a lieutenant with a South African D.C.M., was mortally wounded on the German wire and taken prisoner. The casualties were numerous. Davenport himself was wounded, but unselfishly refused treatment until his men had been fetched in. It was a night of battle and excitement. To the most hardened troops a barrage directed against crowded breastworks was never pleasant. The Battalion bore itself well and earned recital, albeit with some misdescription, in the English press a few days later.
During July 1916 the Battalion was in and out of the breastworks between Fauquissart and Neuve Chapelle. When the 184th Infantry Brigade went back to rest the Battalion had billets on the outskirts of Merville, a friendly little town, since levelled in ruins ; and, when reserve to the Brigade, in Laventie. Brigade Headquarters were at the latter and also the quartermasters’ stores and transport of battalions in the line.
Some favourite spots were the defensive ‘ posts,’ placed a mile behind the front line and known as Tilleloy, Winchester, Dead End, Picantin. Reserve companies garrisoned these posts. No arduous duties spoilt the days; night work consisted chiefly in pushing trolley-loads of rations to the front line. Of these posts the best remembered would be Winchester, where existed a board bearing
the names of Wykhamists, whom chance had led that way. Battalion Headquarters were there for a long time and were comfortable enough with many ‘elephant’ dug-outs and half a farm-house for a mess the latter ludicrously decorated by some
predecessors with cuttings from La Vie Parisienne and other picture papers.
Though conditions were never quiet in the front line, during the summer of 1916 back area shelling was infrequent. Shells fell near Laventie cross- roads on most days and, when a 12 inch howitzer established itself behind the village, the Germans
retaliated upon it with 5.95, but otherwise shops and estaminets flourished with national nonchalance. The railway, which ran from La Gorgue to Armentieres, was used by night as far as Bac St. Maur
an instance of unenterprise on the part of German gunners. Despite official repudiation, on our side the principle of ‘ live and let live ‘ was still applied to back areas. Trench warfare, which in the words of a 1915 pamphlet ‘could and must cease’ had managed to survive that pamphlet and the abortive strategy of the battle of Loos. Until trench warfare ended divisional headquarters were not shelled.
Meanwhile the comparative deadlock in the Somme fighting rendered necessary vigorous measures against the enemy elsewhere on the front. A gas attack from the Fauquissart sector was planned but never carried out. Trench mortars and rifle grenades were continuously employed to make life as unpleasant as possible for the enemy, whose trenches soon became, to all appearances, a rubbish heap. All day and much of the night the
‘mediums’ fell in and about the German trenches and, it must be confessed, occasionally in our own as well. Whilst endeavouring to annihilate the Wick salient or some such target, one of our heaviest of heavy trench mortars dropped short (perhaps that is too much of a compliment to the particular shot) in our trenches near a company headquarters and almost upon a new concrete refuge, which the R.E. had just completed and not yet shown to the Brigadier. Though sometimes supplied, the cooperation of this arm was never asked for.
This harassing warfare had a crisis in July. The operations of July 19, which were shared with the 61st Division by the 5th Australian holding trenches further north, were designed as a demonstration to assist our attack upon the Somme and to hold opposite to the XI Corps certain German reserves, which, it was feared, would entrain at Lille and be sent south. That object was achieved, but at the cost of severe casualties to the divisions engaged, which were launched in daylight after artillery preparation, which results proved to have been inadequate, against a trench-system strongly manned and garrisoned by very numerous machine- guns. The objectives assigned to the 61st Division were not captured, while the Australians further north, after entering the German trenches and taking prisoners, though they held on tenaciously under heavy counter-attacks, were eventually forced to withdraw. ‘ The staff work,’ said the farewell
message from the XI Corps to the 61st Division three months later, ‘ for these operations was excellent.’ Men and officers alike did their utmost to make the attack of July 19 a success, and it
behoves all to remember the sacrifice of those who fell with appropriate gratitude. It was probably the last occasion on which large parties of storming infantry were sent forward through ‘sally ports’.
The Battalion was in reserve for the attack. C Company, which formed a carrying party during the fighting, lost rather heavily, but the rest of the Battalion, though moved hither and thither under heavy shelling, suffered few casualties. When the battle was over, companies relieved part of the line and held the trenches until normal conditions returned.
Soon after these events the Battalion was unlucky to be deprived of Colonel Ames, a leader whose energy and common sense could ill be spared. This was the first change which the Battalion had in its Commanding Officer, and it was much regretted. A change in Adjutant had occurred likewise, Major D. M. Rose having been
invalided to England early in July and his place taken by R. F. Cuthbert, formerly commander of D Company. Orderly Room work passed from safe hands into hands equally safe. Soon after-
wards I joined the Battalion, having been transferred from the 1/4th, and received command of D Company. The new Commanding Officer, Major R. Bellamy, D.S.O., came from the Royal Sussex Regiment and assumed command early in August. Robinson, an officer from the Middlesex and one of the best the Battalion ever had, Callender and Barton also joined about this time. Brucker, of C Company, became Adjutant of the 61st Divisional School, and command of his company passed to Kenneth Brown, a great fighter and best of comrades, the first member of this Battalion to win the Military Cross. Major Beaman was still Second in Command. Two original officers of the 2/4th, Jack Bennett and Hugh Davenport, commanded A and B Companies respectively. W. A. Hobbs, well known as Mayor of Henley, was Quartermaster, and ‘Bob’ Abraham the Transport
Officer. Regimental Sergeant-Major Douglas and Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant Hedges were the senior warrant officers.
Higher up a new Brigadier in the person of General Dugan arrived and held command for a short while. The General, I regret to say, did not stay long enough for the full benefit of his experience and geniality to accrue, a fragment of a Stokes’ mortar shell wounding him at a demonstration near Merville and causing his retirement to hospital. The new Brigadier, the Hon. R. White, C.M.G., joined us at the beginning of September, 1916, from action on the Somme, and soon made his cheery criticisms felt.
After the operations of July 19 the former methods of trench warfare were resumed. The Division’s casualties in the attack had been over 2,000, and time was required to reorganise and make up these losses.
Early in August an unlucky shell deprived the Battalion of one of its best officers. Lieutenant Tiddy had joined the Infantry in a spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, which his service as an officer had proved but to which his death more amply testified. The regrets of friends and comrades measured the Battalion’s loss.
At 10 p.m. on August 19 a raid upon the German trenches near the ‘Sugar Loaf’ was carried out by A Company. The raid was part of an elaborate scheme in which the Australians upon the left and
the 2 /5th Gloucesters on our own front co-operated. The leading bombing party, which Bennett sent forward under Sergeant Hinton, quickly succeeded in reaching the German parapet and was doing well, when a Mills bomb, dropped or inaccurately thrown, fell amongst the men. The plan was spoilt.
A miniature panic ensued, which Bennett and his Sergeant-Major found it difficult to check. As in many raids, a message to retire was passed. The wounded were safely brought in by Bennett, whose control and leadership were worthy of a luckier
enterprise.
The Battalion was not called upon for much fighting activity in September, 1916. Raids and rumours of raids kept many of us busy. An attack by the 184th Brigade upon the Wick salient was
planned, but somewhat too openly discussed and practised to deceive, I fancy, even the participating infantry into the belief that it was really to take place. Upon the demolished German trenches
many raids were made. In the course of these raids, the honour of which was generously shared between all battalions in the Brigade, sometimes by means of the Bangalore Torpedo, sometimes by the easier and more subtle method of just walking into them, the enemy’s front line was usually entered; and rarely did a raiding party return without the capture of at least an old bomb, an entrenching tool or even a live German. These ‘ identification ‘ raids possibly did as much to identify ourselves to the enemy as to identify him to us, but they proved useful occasions on which to send parties ‘ over the top’ (always an enjoyable treat!) and gave practice to our trench mortars, which fired remarkably well and drew down little retaliation always the bugbear of the trench mortar.
1 A failure of this kind, was far less due to any indetermination of the men than to the complex nature of the scheme, which any misadventure was capable of upsetting-. On this occasion the ‘ order to retire ‘ was said to have been of German manufacture, but such explanation deserved a grain of salt. Owing to the danger of its unauthorised use, the word ‘ retire ‘ was prohibited by Army orders.
The mention of these things may make dull reading to the blase warrior of later battlefields, but, as there are some whose last experience abroad was during Laventie days and who may read these lines, I feel bound to recall our old friend (or enemy) the
trench mortar, the rent-free (but not rat-free) dug- out among the sandbags, the smelly cookhouses, whose improvident fires were the scandal of many a red-hatted visitor to the trenches, the mines, with their population of Colonial miners doing mysterious work in their basements of clay and flinging up a welter of slimy blue sandbags all these deserve mention, if no more, lest they be too soon forgotten.
Days, too, in Riez Bailleul, Estaires and Merville will be remembered, days rendered vaguely precious by the subsequent destruction of those villages and by lost comrades. Those of the
Battalion who fell in 1916 were mostly buried in Laventie and outside Merville. Though both were being fought over in 1918 and many shells fell among the graves, the crosses were not much damaged ; inscriptions, if nearly obliterated, were then
renewed when, by the opportunity of chance, the Battalion found itself once more crossing the familiar area, before it helped to establish a line upon the redoubtable Aubers ridge, to gain which so many lives at the old 1915 battles of Neuve Chapelle and
Festubert had been expended.
It was a fine autumn. The French civilians were getting in their crops within a mile or two of the trenches, while we did a series of tours in the Moated Grange sector, with rest billets at the little
village of Riez Bailleul.
And then box respirators were issued.
Laventie days are remembered with affection by old members of the Battalion. In October, 1916, however, there were some not sorry to quit an area, which in winter became one of the wettest and most dismal in France. The Somme battle, which for three months had rumbled in the distance like a huge thunderstorm, was a magnet to attract all divisions in turn. The predictions of the French billet keepers were realised at the end of October, when the 2/4th Oxfords were relieved in the trenches by a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and prepared to march southwards to the Somme.”
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
“This harassing warfare had a crisis in July. The operations of July 19, which were shared with the 61st Division by the 5th Australian holding trenches further north, were designed as a demonstration to assist our attack upon the Somme and to hold opposite to the XI Corps certain German reserves, which, it was feared, would entrain at Lille and be sent south. That object was achieved, but at the cost of severe casualties to the divisions engaged, which were launched in daylight after artillery preparation, which results proved to have been inadequate, against a trench-system strongly manned and garrisoned by very numerous machine- guns. The objectives assigned to the 61st Division were not captured, while the Australians further north, after entering the German trenches and taking prisoners, though they held on tenaciously under heavy counter-attacks, were eventually forced to withdraw. ‘ The staff work,’ said the farewell
message from the XI Corps to the 61st Division three months later, ‘ for these operations was excellent.’ Men and officers alike did their utmost to make the attack of July 19 a success, and it
behoves all to remember the sacrifice of those who fell with appropriate gratitude. It was probably the last occasion on which large parties of storming infantry were sent forward through ‘sally ports. The Battalion was in reserve for the attack. C Company, which formed a carrying party during the fighting, lost rather heavily, but the rest of the Battalion, though moved hither and thither under heavy shelling, suffered few casualties. When the
battle was over, companies relieved part of the line and held the trenches until normal conditions returned.”
2/4th Royal Berkshire War Diaries
Wednesday 19th July 1916, France, Laventie
Artillery preparation opened at 11am attack at 6pm 2/1 Bucks on our Left. Australian Division on Left of 2/1 Bucks. 183rd Bde on our Right and 182nd Bde on Right of 183rd Bde, 8th and 61st Divisional Artillery behind our lines.
Casualties Officers 3 Killed (Lt Col J H Beer, 2/Lieut G S Abbott and 2/Lieut F C D Williams) and 2 wounded (Major T Shields and 2/Lieut D R Gibson). Other ranks 35K, 115W and 8 Shell Shock. Bn relieved by 2/4 Oxford and Bucks LI at 1030pm. Marched back into billets at Rue De La Lys (G.27.c.2.2 1/2).
2/5th Gloucestershire Regiment
Story of the 2/5th Battalion the Gloucester Regiment 1914-1918
ed by A.F.Barnes
ISBN: 9781843427582
Format: 2003 N&M Press reprint (original pub 1930) 192pp with 39 b/w photos and 12 maps.
“Round about the middle of July ominous rumours got about of an impending attack by the 61st Division in cooperation with an Australian Division and movements became irregular. Small groups of Staff Officers and Commanding Officers could be seen, maps in hand, whispering together; large quantities of artillery began to assemble; trench mortars commenced to operate more frequently a “flying pig” memorable because another member of this porcine family had previously registered on this sector, dropped its message short and blown up two or three fire bays on its own side, made its appearance.
Australians loading a 9.45 inch mortar, “Flying Pig”, August 1916.
These omens materialized when on July 19th an attack was launched. The ostensible objective was the Aubers Ridge, some high ground opposite the British front from which the Germans could command a view of all the movements of their opponents. The real intention of the operation was to keep the German Divisions there so fully occupied that they would not be able to reinforce the troops on the Somme.
The Berks and the Bucks bore the brunt of the attack, while the Oxfords and Glosters were in support and reserve respectively. So far as the Aubers Ridge was concerned the attack failed dismally, but it probably had the effect of keeping the German Divisions there, at any rate, for the time being. The casualties of the 184th brigade were very heavy, the Bucks being especially hard hit. The lot that fell to the Glosters was the depressing task of bringing in and burying the dead. This operation took three or four days to complete and it is notable that the Germans allowed the stretcher-bearers and others to others to wander about No Man’s Land in broad daylight, picking up the dead and wounded without firing a shot.”
Please check out http://pondfarm.wimme.net/en/introduction. The link was kindly provided by Stijn Butaye.
A very good German Web site: www.flanderland.de has a page dedicated to Pond Farm with both pictures from 1917 and some recent photographs of the bunker.
2/5th Gloucestershire Regiment
Story of the 2/5th Battalion the Gloucester Regiment 1914-1918
ed by A.F.Barnes
ISBN: 9781843427582
Format: 2003 N&M Press reprint (original pub 1930) 192pp with 39 b/w photos and 12 maps.
This is essential reading for anyone interested in the 2/5th Gloucester Regiment and the other battalions that made up the 184th (2nd South Midland) Brigade
“The Battalion moved first Buysscheure area and then to the Wattou area, and on August 21st it went up the line to support trenches in Warwick Farm, east of the big Wieltje Dugout which was Brigade Headquarters and advanced Field Ambulance dressing station.
On August 22nd the Brigade attacked with the Oxfords on the left and the Bucks on the right. The Glosters were in support. At the last moment, the orders for the Glosters were altered and two Companies were ordered to move into position at zero hour behind the Oxfords and two behind the Bucks. Headquarters was at Call Reserve, a big German concrete that had been captured. The Oxfords were commanded by Lt.-Col. R. H. Wetherall, a young regular officer of the Gloucester Regiment, the Bucks by a very cheery officer of the Black Watch Territorials, by the name of Lt.-Col. J. Muir.
Both Battalions made a magnificent advance, which carried them right forward almost to their limits. But as so often happened, the losses were so great that it was impossible to hold the farthest objectives, and they were pushed back fighting hard. Soon D Company was dispatched to reinforce the left, and B Company the right. While moving up with D Company, gallant Seymour Tubbs was killed while leading his men.
The expression, “he was loved by everyone” became rather the convention of the day; but in the case of Capt. Tubbs, it was literally true, because he possessed in an unusual degree the gift for friendship. Wherever he was there radiated a warmth of happy comradeship; a capable and gallant officer, a perfect sportsman, a delightful companion, he could ill be spared.
In the centre of the Oxfords’ advance was a grim and giant fortress called Pond Farm, manned by fifty picked German machine-gunners with five guns. This fortress had resisted the assaults of no less than five divisions in previous fighting. At 12 noon, two platoons attacked it after a hurricane bombardment. Two platoons from C company were then sent up, and these, with D Company, stormed the concrete fortress with great dash, killing or capturing its entire garrison. The losses were heavy: 2nd Lieutenants Davis and Blythe, and 16 other ranks were killed, and 2nd Lieut. Ross Jenkins and 51 other ranks were wounded and one other was missing.
During the night there was an unfortunate incident. The garrison was small and no other officer of the Glosters left, and one of another unit detailed to take command did not arrive. A fierce German counter-attack, launched at the right was beaten off by the Bucks with D Company, but swerving away, it swept on to the flank and rear of Pond Farm and recaptured it. It was a great pity, but the memory of the gallant attack which captured the fortress wipes out any small stain caused by its weak garrison losing it. Next day it was easily recaptured.
On the right flank D Company under command of Lieut. Johnston, was soon sent forward to support the bucks and detailed to hold and consolidate a line just west of Hill 35. The gallant Scotch officer, helped by his men performed deeds of valour: he consolidated his line, roped in stragglers from another Division and put them in position, extended his line to get into touch right and left, and beat off every counter-attack. His report to the Commanding Officer at Call Reserve, written under heavy shell fire in the open, was the most cheerful document ever penned. He was highly commended by Lt.-Col. Muir, and sent to Corps Headquarters to give an account of the fight. He was recommended for the D.S.O. and was awarded the M.C. He is perhaps best described as one who was just as happy in a fight as at a tea party surrounded by pretty girls. The Battalion was relieved by the 2/6th Glosters and moved to Red Rose Camp for refitting.”
The 2/1st Bucks
The following is extracted from:
“Citizen Soldiers of Buckinghamshire 1795-1926″ by Major General J. C. Swann
On the 15th August the Battalion (2/1st Bucks) moved to Abeele and on the 18th to Goldfish Chateau Camp near Ypres. On the evening of the 20th they advanced to the support line just forward of Wieltje, having many casualties on the way from shell fire. After dark they went into the line in the Pommern Castle sector, Headquarters at Uhlan Farm, “C” Company on the left, “B” on the right (front line), “D” left support, “A” right support. The next day was spent in preparations for the attack on the 22nd.
Of the 61st Division the 184th Brigade was told off for the attack, having the 44th Infantry Brigade, 15th Division, on their right, and the 143rd Brigade, 48th Division, on their left. The Bucks were to make the attack on the right, the Oxfords on the left of the Brigade, each Battalion taking a frontage of approximately 700 yards.
The Bucks were to advance with two Companies forming the first and second waves, and two Companies forming the third and fourth; the Oxfords were to attack with three Companies forming the first and second and one Company the third wave. Eight platoons of the Royal Berks were to be attached to the Bucks as “moppers-up’ and five to the Oxfords. The Glosters and one Battalion of the 183rd Brigade were in Brigade reserve. The final objective was the position on the Kansas Cross—Winnipeg Road.
The “moppers-up” were to deal with the strong posts at Somme, Aisne, Gunpits, Cross Cotts, Green House, Martha, Keir Farm, and various dug-outs, and to be ready to cover the flanks if necessary. This would enable the main attack to push forward to take the main position without delaying to clear the strong points in advance of it.
At 4.45 a.m. the Artillery put down the barrage and the waves advanced, disregarding the strong posts and pressing forward as close as possible to the barrage in accordance with the orders they had received. The “moppers-up,” in attempting to follow, suffered heavily in casualties from machine-gun and rifle fire, the garrisons of the posts behind their concrete walls put up a stubborn resistance. The Somme and Aisne Farms were taken, but the latter retaken almost at once by the enemy. Pond Farm in front of the Oxfords on the left and Gallipoli in front of the 7th Cameron Highlanders on the right remained in the possession of the enemy.
The position of the advancing waves of the Bucks became more and more serious, but still they pressed on, and some at least reached their objective, though exposed to fire from front, flanks, and rear, and entirely cut off from all communication. Meanwhile a company of the 2/5th Gloucesters, under Second Lieutenant Johnston, with the few remaining men available with the Battalion, consolidated a line of shell-holes for the defence of Somme Farm that had been won by a platoon of the Berks, only three men of which remained to follow Second Lieutenant St. Leger into the post and to deal with the 14 survivors of the garrison. Three counter-attacks were made on the newly consolidated line, but were caught by the fire of our Artillery, and easily repulsed by the Infantry. The enemy snipers were much in evidence throughout the day, any movement that might suggest a runner with information for Headquarters attracted their special attention; even stretcher-bearers and wounded crawling painfully back were not spared.
At 4 p.m., with the assistance of two platoons of the 2/5th Gloucesters, the Oxfords finally assaulted and captured Pond Farm. This much relieved the pressure on the left of the Bucks, and they were able to straighten out the line. A party was sent forward to take the gun-pits, but found them deserted by the enemy and giving shelter to many of the wounded of the Battalion.
The losses were found to have been very heavy 13 officers and 637 other ranks went into action, 11 officers and 338 other ranks were reported as casualties.
Killed: Second Lieutenant C. R. Tyson and 46 other ranks.
Died of wounds: Captain J. E. S. Wilson, R.A.M.C., Second Lieutenants Gibson and W. R. Gill.
Wounded: Captain G. C. Stevens, Second Lieutenants T. S. Markham, G. P. Steed, and W. H. Petrie, and 156 other ranks.
Missing: Captain H. R. Foster, Second Lieutenants H. E. Molloy and W. E. Rolfe (presumed dead), and 122 other ranks.
Of the missing 19 were afterwards traced as prisoners of war, and 103 presumed killed. Nine of the prisoners were wounded when captured. At night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/7th Worcesters. The Battalion returned to their old bivouac at Goldfish Chateau, a sad return. Except “A” Company, all were commanded by Sergeants. The men were in the last stage of exhaustion, the strongest Company had barely 80, the weakest just over 50 in the ranks.
After one night at Goldfish Chateau the Battalion moved back to Brandhoek.
2/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment
War Diaries of the 2/4th Royal Berkshires
Tuesday 21st August 1917 Belgium, Trenches Wieltje
“The day was fairly quiet except for heavy shelling between 9am and 11am. In the evening the various platoons moved to their point of assembly for the following days attack. Casualties 1 OR killed, 13 OR wounded.”
Wednesday 22nd August 1917, Belgium, Trenches Wieltje
The 184th Infantry Brigade attacked the enemy defences from D14 c.6.7. to D7 c. 3.5 (Map FREZENBERG 1/10000 attached).
The 44th Brigade 15th Division attacked on the Right, and the 143rd Brigade 48th Division attacked on the Left.
Zero was at 4.45am August 22nd, an which hour the Infantry advanced and the Barrage commenced. The 2/1st Bucks Battalion, Ox and Bucks Light Infantry attacked on Right, the 2/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry attacked on the Left.
The 2/4th Royal Berks found 13 platoons to attack various Strong Points which were known to exist. They followed close behind the leading Infantry, and on nearing their Objectives, dashed through the leading waves and assaulted the Strong Points.
The various platoons were detailed as follows:-
Platoon Commander Objective
No 1 2/Lt A C L Hill Somme
No 4 2/Lt G W de St Legier Somme
No 2 2/Lt A K Glover Cross Cott
No 3 2/Lt C L B Kirkland Aisne House
No 5 2/Lt H W Jewell Schuler
No 6 2/Lt G A F Gilmor Pond Farm
No 13 2/Lt F A N Wilmot Pond Farm
No 7 2/Lt A E Saw Left flank guard for 2/4 Oxfords.
No 8 2/Lt F Exler Hindu
No 9 2/Lt W H Stevens Marth Ho
No 12 2/Lt A H Robinson MarthHo
No 10 2/Lt D Mackinnon Green Ho
No 11 2/Lt H S Griffin Gun positions near D13 central
The first Strong Point encountered was Pond Farm. This was attacked from both flanks, 2nd Lieut F A N Wilmot working in from the Right, and 2nd Lieut G A F Gilmor from the Left. Both these Officers were wounded before reaching the farm. Owing to heavy machine gun fire Sgt Shackleford, then in charge of No 13 platoon found he was unable to take the Farm, revelries these platoons kept the garrison of the Strong Point strongly engaged, thus enabling the assaulting waves and the platoons for the further Objectives to push forward without any serious trouble, Sgt Shackleford then reorganised his platoon and made a fresh attack on the Farm but on getting within 20 yards of his Objective he was again held up by very heavy machine gun fire. However he succeeded in surrounding the Farm, keeping the garrison fully occupied till late in the afternoon he joined two platoon of the 2/5th Glosters and helped to successfully assault and enter the Farm. There were 35 Prisoners taken by us at this Strong Point.
The next Strong Point encountered on the Left was Hindu, 2/Lt F Exler was wounded as soon as the Infantry advanced, but the platoon carried on and owing to the marshy state of the ground were unable to enter the Farm. However they succeeded in advancing beyond and surrounding the Strong Point, thus enabling the assaulting waves to push forward. Pte Pike of “A” coy having lost his own platoon succeeded in entering this Strong Point, and found it garrisoned by 19 Germans, 13 of whom were unwounded. He took all these prisoners, and himself remained there alone for two days guarding them until he was relieved by an Officer of the 2/6th Glosters.
The remaining Strong Point on the Left was Schuler. Despite the fact that the left Division was held up and that his flank was exposed 2nd Lieut H W Jewell pushed forward and stormed the Schuler Galleries, taking 2 Officers and 74 OR prisoners. These he dispatched to the rear. He then consolidated and held his post breaking up three local counter attacks. This post was almost isolated owing to the right flank falling back, but by great determination they held on for two days, till they were relieved by the 2/6th Glosters.
The first Strong Point encountered on the Right was Somme. On nearing this 2nd Lieut G W de St Legierpushed forward ahead of the leading waves and together with two men rushed through our own Barrage and entered this post from the rear, killing the whole of the garrison. He afterwards consolidated the position and broke up several local counter attacks and held his post until he was relieved two days later.
Owing to the 15th Division being held up, and very heavy flanking machine gun fire being directed on our troops from Hill 35 and Gallopoli, the attacks on Green House, Cross Cott and Martha House were unsuccessful but these platoons helped the 2/1st Bucks to form a line running roughly from Somme in rear of Aisne House close to the Gun Pits at D13 Central, on to SchulerGalleries. Three enemy Counter attacks were repulsed.
Tanks were employed, but were unsuccessful owing to the marshy state of the ground. The line was taken over on the night of the 23/24th by the 183rd Infantry Brigade and the Battalion marched back to a camp at Goldfish Chateau, the last platoon arriving about 6am. Casualties for the 22nd/23rd were as follows:-
7 Officers – 2nd Lieuts F A N Wilmot, GAF Gilmor, F Exler, C L B Kirkland, A K Glover, A H Robinson and AE Saw wounded.
2 Officers – 2nd Lieuts H S Griffin and D MacKinnon wounded and missing.
32 OR killed.
111 OR wounded.
25 OR wounded and missing.
54 OR missing.”
Friday 24th August 1917 Belgium, Goldfish Chateau
“The whole day was devoted to rest.”
Abeele: Their are some very good photographs of Abeele on a Web site dedicated to the Calgary Highlanders, 10th Battalion.
Please see:
The Attack on Pond Farm, 22nd August, 1917
Attack on Strongpoints, South East of St. Julian, 22nd August 1917
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
September 1917
“When George Moore left in September, 1917, to take command of a Battalion, the third Brigade Major who makes a figure in my history appeared, H. G. Howitt. In the sequence fortune continued to favour the Brigade. Howitt was a Territorial whose prowess had been proved in the Somme fighting. In place of a long staff training he brought business powers. He was indulgent of everythlng save fear, laziness, and inefficiency. Stout-hearted himself, he expected stoutness in others; this was the right attitude of a staff officer. Though a business man by training, he did not negotiate with the war; in him everything was better than his writing. Of these three, Gepp, Moore, Howitt, it would be difficult to name the best Brigade Major; the I84th Brigade was happy in the trio.”
From a letter by Brigade-Major Harold Howitt, 183rd Brigade, 61st Division, to his wife Dorothy, 30/3/1918. Found in full in To The Last Man, Spring 1918, by Lyn Macdonald, Carroll & Graf, 1998.
My Dearest of All,
I am not going to say that I have not had a stiff time for you would not believe me and it would shake your faith in my reports – I will therefore confess to the worst week I remember, with the assurance that I am perfectly fit and cheery. Till last night I had not slept at all since 20th (March 1918) and have never before been so completely tired – I literally slept while walking or riding. I have had 6 different Brigade Commanders, besides a long period when I was in command myself, and yesterday we got our new General who saw I was a bit done and made me turn in – so I had a perfect night & feel now as fit as a lark.
I could not hope to describe the events of of the past 10 days – they have been incessant battle of the fiercest king & details must just come out by degrees round our own fireside. My little diary has of course been impossible but I will try some time to collect a few notes – the one I was keeping I tactfully discarded whilst a prisoner for there were many things in it uncomplimentary to the Hun & they would have gone against me. – as it was they threatened to shoot me for throwing away a note I had in my hand which they thought was valuable information but turned out to be nothing.
Col. Wetherall got a nasty wound & I am going to boast that he owes his life to me. An H.E. splinter got him in the throat whilst talking to me and severed one of the main arteries & cut his throat – he gushed all over me & it was a long time before I could stop it, but he was a model of self-possession & I lay with him for over an hour till a doctor could be found. All the time the Hun was attacking & I had to keep one eye on him & the other on messages that were coming in & yet not let Wetherall know. Finally the Hun was right round us for he had taken Vesle on our left & there was nothing for it but to make tracks at once – we had no stretcher so output the old Colonel on a bike and pushed him along. I hear is all right & you can look for his name in the future as one of the soldiers of our day – and I ave never met a finer fellow.
Our Casualties have of course been terrific & we practically do not exist as a Brigade – however we are hanging on & I hope to do so. The main Hun thrust is broken & if the weather does not let us down again we may get our own back yet. However I hope I shan’t shock you so soon after confirmation if I say I am either an atheist or the Diety as Ye Weather Committee wants the Hun to win – he has favoured him hourly the whole time.
One of the most pathetic sights has been the evacuation of the villages with all the refugees & their little Tonys.* I have felt ashamed of myself to see them & yet I don’t think we could have done more. As to our own little Tony I hope he is well – I often think of him & of you – we will have an even happier time together hereafter because of all this trial & rest assured I ave never been more contented in my life nor more sure I was in the right place. I have even felt at times that Providence is keeping me rather specially for you and him for else Heaven knows why I am still here. All is quiet now…
Love, love, love,
Harold
* ‘Little Tony” was the couple’s name for the baby Dorothy was expecting. They were hoping for a boy, but when he was born, in August, ‘he’ turned out to be a girl, Mary. However Tony Howitt did arrive two years later, in happier times.
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
25th March 1918
“At 11 a.m. on March 25 the enemy attacked. As often during these days, when a line was held solidly in one place, it broke elsewhere. By noon the enemy had captured Nesle, and the left flank of the Brigade was turned. During the fight Colonel Wetherall was wounded in the neck by a piece of shell and owed his life to the Brigade Major, Howitt, who held the arteries.”
12th April 1918
By now Corps Headquarters, after a three years’ sojourn at Hinges, had commenced to scour the country west of Aire for a suitable remote château. Except for Howitt there was no staff officer upon the spot, and we round after passing St. Venant towards Robecq that it was everyman for himself in the task of stemming the German attack.”
Sometime after this he was captured by the Germans. I found the following article on the Web site of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales:
“Sir Harold Gibson Howitt
President, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales 1945-6
Sir Harold Gibson Howitt (ICAEW President 1945-46) was taken prisoner during the Spring Offensive of 1918 and in his autobiography describes the moment of his capture in great detail, including one tense moment in which he was put up against a fence and threatened with the prospect of being shot before eventually escaping back to British lines as the Germans advanced. Later, George Nancarrow (his partner in the accountancy firm W.B. Peat & Co) recalled that a story remarkably similar to Sir Harold’s had been published by John Buchan in the daily press.
On home leave after the event Sir Harold Gibson Howitt discovered that John Buchan was a friend of his brigadier and that he had called on him as he was struggling to find copy for the latest episode of his serial. The brigadier handed over a letter from his brigade major, Harold Howitt, recounting the tale of his escape. After the war John Buchan wanted to meet one of his characters and as a result they met at the House of Commons.
Sir Harold Howitt’s Version
Extracts from a typescript of Sir Harold Howitt’s autobiography ‘Reminiscences of Harold Gibson Howitt‘ (circa 1967) held in the collection of the ICAEW Library & Information Service.
After being captured by German soldiers during the Spring Offensive of 1918 Harold was marched by his captors back to the German lines.
‘After a time they handed me over to two soldiers armed with revolvers and I was sent outside. There I saw the next assault being prepared, mules carrying machine guns and mortars, and all in full array. Then a gold and silver rain rocket went up all along the front, and this was obviously the signal for the advance. My escort, not knowing what else to do, made me also go forward and, as this was towards our lines, I acquiesced.’ (Reminiscences of Harold Gibson Howitt, page 43)
They were soon turned back, passing German soldiers going forwards. Determined to escape if he could, Harold noticed ‘a dip in the road full of mist and smoke’ which he thought looked a ‘likely place’. Harold described what happened next,
‘As luck would have it, when we were at the bottom, one of our shells dropped unpleasantly close and, looking over my shoulder, I noticed that both my guards had ducked into a shell hole behind. With no plan in mind I instinctively leapt at the first man to get up’ … ‘all I could do was throw one man against the other and roll them both into the ditch at the side of the road. For a moment I wondered what one does next, and even whether I ought to apologise. However, I recovered my wits and ran for it.’ … ‘They were soon up and emptying their revolvers at me, but they missed’. (Reminiscences of Harold Gibson Howitt, pages 43-44)
Harold made a successful escape and headed towards a burning ammunition dump at Beauvois, dodging potshots and isolated outposts of soldiers.
I crawled as near as I dared between two posts and was just going to spring when I heard one of the men utter a well-known British oath (I always say it is the most blessed word in our language) and I knew I had got through the German patrols and had bumped up against our own rearguard line’ (Reminiscences of Harold Gibson Howitt, page 45)
John Buchan’s version
Extract from the e-version of Mr. Standfast by John Buchan, originally published as a serial form in the press and collected together in book form in 1919. The e-version is now available as part of the Gutenberg project.
Mr. Standfast by John Buchan
‘There to my surprise I found Lefroy. The Boche had held him prisoner for precisely eight hours. During that time he had been so interested in watching the way the enemy handled an attack that he had forgotten the miseries of his position. He described with blasphemous admiration the endless wheel by which supplies and reserve troops move up, the silence, the smoothness, the perfect discipline. Then he had realized that he was a captive and unwounded, and had gone mad. Being a heavy-weight boxer of note, he had sent his two guards spinning into a ditch, dodged the ensuing shots, and found shelter in the lee of a blazing ammunition dump where his pursuers hesitated to follow. Then he had spent an anxious hour trying to get through an outpost line, which he thought was Boche. Only by overhearing an exchange of oaths in the accents of Dundee did he realize that it was our own … It was a comfort to have Lefroy back, for he was both stout-hearted and resourceful. But I found that I had a division only on paper. It was about the strength of a brigade, the brigades battalions, and the battalions companies.’ (Mr Standfast by John Buchan, 1919. Chapter Twenty-One: How an Exile Returned to His Own People).
There is reference to a H.G.Howitt at www.invisionzone.com
“3-8-1917 Yorkshire Regt.—Capt. C. Sproxton, M.C., to be Adjt., vice Lt. (temp. Capt.) H. G. Howitt. 12th Apr. 1917.”
There is a one page biography in British Accountants: A Biographical Sourcebook, by Robert Henry Parker.
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
Late April 1917
“Colonel Bellamy’s successor, H. de R. Wetherall, was a young man whom ability and leadership had already lifted to distinction in his regiment and placed in command of an important military school. From now onwards he is the outstanding figure in the Battalion’s history. In the new Colonel a quick brain was linked with vigorous physique. In spite of his Regular training, Wetherall could appreciate and himself possessed to no small degree the peculiar virtues of the temporary officer, who based his methods on common sense and actual experience in the war rather than servile obedience to red tape and ‘Regulations.’ He had studied during the war as well as before it, with the result that military tradition – his regiment was the Gloucestershire – and his long service in the field combined to fit him for command of our Battalion.”
June 1917
“A totally different spirit characterised training in France. Colonel Wetherall was a master of the art of teaching. His emphatic direction and enthusiasm earned early reward in the increased efficiency of all ranks.”
August 1917
“The capture of this had been assigned to the 48th Division, but as a measure of abundant caution Colonel Wetherall had detailed a special Berks platoon to tackle it. This platoon, assisted by some Oxfords on the scene, captured the gun-pit and nearly seventy prisoners, but failed to garrison it.”
September 1917
“The defence of the three strongholds, Iberian, Hill 35, and Gallipoli provided a striking example of German stubbornness and skill, but added an object-lesson in the squandering of our efforts in attack. Operations upon a general scale having failed to capture all three, it was fantastically hoped that each could be reduced separately. Iberian, Hill 35, and Gallipoli supported one another, nor was it feasible to hold any without holding all. Yet to take Hill 35 on September 9 the 2/4th Oxfords were specially selected. The spirit of A and D Companies, chosen by Colonel Wetherall for the attack, was excellent. We confidently believed that we could succeed where others failed. Optimism, so vital an ingredient in morale, was a powerful assistant to the English Army. It was fostered, perhaps unconsciously, throughout the war by the cheerful attitude preserved by our Generals and staff, but its foundation lay in our great system of supply. The A.S.C.,
which helped to win our victories, helped, too, to temper our defeats.
On September 7 Brown and myself went up through Ypres to view the scene of the attack. At Wieltje, where Colonel Wetherall and B and C Companies already were, we descended to a deep, wet dug-out and that night listened to a narrative brought by an officer who had participated in the last attempt to take the hill. He dispensed the most depressing information about the gun_pits, the machine-guns, the barrages, and last, but not least terrible (if believed), the new incendiary Verey lights used by the Germans to cremate their assailants. The description of a piece of trench, which we were to capture and block, particularly flattered our prospects. ‘Wide, shallow trench, enfiladed from Gallipoli, filled with the Division dead,’ it ran. The tale of horror becoming ludicrous, we soon afterwards clambered on to the wire bunks
and slept, dripped on, till the early morning.”
November 1917
“A series of gas projections. smoke barrages, and raids were to take place. The better to maintain secrecy from the German ‘listening-sets’ no telephones were used. The Battalion bore its share in the programme: already at Arras plans for a novel raid were under contemplation. Cuthbert had devised a scheme, which
Colonel Wetherall adopted and chose B Company,under Moberly, to carry out.”
“Now it was planned by Wetherall to fire lethal gas against the enemy for several nights. On the night of the raid and during it, non-lethal only would be used. The two gases smelt alike and the presumption was that on the night of the raid the enemy would wear gas-helmets.”
21st March 1918
“At Enghien Redoubt Battalion Headquarters had received no news of the attack having begun; the dense mist limited the view to fifty, yards. The earliest intimation received by Colonel Wetherall of what was taking place was enemy rifle and machine-gun tire sweeping the parapet.”
22nd March 1918
“Early on Match 22 Colonel Wetherall, limping and tired, arrived. He bore the tale of his adventure. During the 21st we saw him disappear from Enghien Redoubt to go on a reconnaissance. Near Holnon he was surrounded by an enemy patrol and led a prisoner towards St. Quentin but when the fire of 6-inch howitzers scared his escort into shell-holes, the Colonel escaped, and the same night, choosing his opportunity to slip between the German digging parties, contrived to reach our lines.”
“Colonel Wetherall had already started on the way to Languevoisin but was caught up at Matigny. He the same night (22nd) regained the Beauvoir line and took command of the Brigade.”
24th March 1918
“On the same day of which I was last speaking, March 24–the 184th Brigade, minus those Oxfords who were in action with the 20th Division. though sadly wasted in numbers, formed up again to make a stand. Colonel Wetherall, the acting Brigadier, had received orders to hold the line of the canal east and south-east of Nesle.”
25th March 1918
“At 11 a.m. on March 25 the enemy attacked. As often during these days, when a line was held solidly in one place, it broke elsewhere. By noon the enemy had captured Nesle, and the left flank of the Brigade was turned. During the fight Colonel Wetherall was wounded in the neck by a piece of shell and owed his life to the Brigade Major, Howitt, who held the arteries.”
“The line was driven back to Billancourt and the same night (25th) the remnants of the XVIII Çorps withdrew in darkness to Roye, a town where our hospitals were still at work, evacuating as fast as possible the streams of wounded from the battle. One of the last patients to leave by train was Wetherall, who at this crisis passed under the care of Stobie, the Oxfords’ old M.O.”
From a letter by Brigade-Major Harold Howitt, 183rd Brigade, 61st Division, to his wife Dorothy, 30/3/1918. Found in full in To The Last Man, Spring 1918, by Lyn Macdonald, Carroll & Graf, 1998.
“Col. Wetherall got a nasty wound & I am going to boast that he owes his life to me. An H.E. splinter got him in the throat whilst talking to me and severed one of the main arteries & cut his throat – he gushed all over me & it was a long time before I could stop it, but he was a model of self-possession & I lay with him for over an hour till a doctor could be found. All the time the Hun was attacking & I had to keep one eye on him & the other on messages that were coming in & yet not let Wetherall know. Finally the Hun was right round us for he had taken Vesle on our left & there was nothing for it but to make tracks at once – we had no stretcher so output the old Colonel on a bike and pushed him along. I hear is all right & you can look for his name in the future as one of the soldiers of our day – and I ave never met a finer fellow.”
From G. K. Rose, The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
Mid-April 1918
“About this time Colonel Boyle, who had commanded the 6th Oxfords until their disbandment, arrived to assume command of the Battalion. He remained till Wetherall, whose wound had taken him to England, returned.”
End of May 1918
“Towards the end of May Colonel Wetherall returned to take command of the Battalion. To be his Second in Command was both a pleasure and a privilege, similar feelings were evoked towards the Brigadier, General Pagan, in whose small frame beat a lion’s heart.”
7th/8th August 1918
Throughout the night of August 7/8, when things generally were very active, a heavy gas-bombardment was kept up. The Colonel was away from his headquarters at the time. He returned after the shelling to find that gas helmets had been taken off. No harm was expected, but the next day after the sun’s heat had awakened dormant fumes, the Colonel, Symonds (the adjutant), Kirk, who had brought up the rations, and Cubbage, as well as the Regimental Sergeant-Major and many signallers and runners, all round that the were gassed. Their loss was serious. It was known that Wetherall would soon have to leave the Battalion, for he had been appointed to a command in the Machine Gun Corps; indeed alreadv his successor, Colonel Woulfe-Flanagan, had arrived to take his place. Under the present unlucky auspices (for more than half Headquarters were knocked out) the interchange took place.
Herodotus says of the kings of Sparta that the last was always regretted as the best the country had ever had. Colonel Wetherall’s merit did not depend on his being the last of a series. Phrases such as ‘he was worshipped by the men’ have become so hackneyed as to be meaningless, nor shall I use an even worse commonplace, that ‘he was sparing of his words.’ Wetherall was just a rattling good Commanding Officer, a true friend, and a fine soldier.”
Further military career:
Harry Edward de Robillard Wetherall
Sir Harry Edward de Robillard Wetherall (born 1889; died 1979) was an officer in the British Army during World War I and World War II.
Lieutenant-General Wetherall commanded the 11th African Division during the East African Campaign. He was part of the “Southern Front” for this campaign. Wetherall commanded the 11th African Division during the advance from Kenya, through Italian Somaliland, and into Ethiopia.
On 23 November 1941, with the campaign all but over, the 11th African Division was disbanded. Wetherall became the acting General Officer Commanding of the East Africa Force.
In 1943, Wetherall moved on to British Ceylon.
Command history
* 1936 to 1938 Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment
* 1938 to 1940 Commanding Officer, 19th Brigade
* 1940 General Officer Commanding, 1st African Division, East Africa
* 1940 to 1941 General Officer Commanding, 11th African Division, East Africa
* 1941 Acting General Officer Commanding, East Africa Force
* 1941 to 1943 General Officer Commanding, Command Area, East Africa
* 1943 to 1945 General Officer Commanding, Ceylon
* 1945 to 1946 Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon
* 1946 Retired
Soldiers of Gloucestershire have a photograph of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Edward de Robillard Wetherall and Major-General C.E.A. Firth. Service of Commemoration and Intercession. Gloucestershire Regiment. Gloucester Cathedral, 17th June 1951.
